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Abstract
Economic interdependencies have become increasingly present in globalized pro-
duction, financial and trade systems. While establishing interdependencies among
economic agents is crucial for the production of complex products, they may also in-
crease systemic risks due to failure propagation. It is crucial to identify how network
connectivity impacts both the emergent production and risk of collapse of economic
systems. In this paper we propose a model to study the effects of network struc-
ture on the behavior of economic systems by varying the density and centralization of
connections among agents. The complexity of production increases with connectivity
given the combinatorial explosion of parts and products. Emergent systemic risks
arise when interconnections increase vulnerabilities. Our results suggest a universal
description of economic collapse given in the emergence of tipping points and phase
transitions in the relationship between network structure and risk of individual failure.
This relationship seems to follow a sigmoidal form in the case of increasingly denser
or centralized networks. The model sheds new light on the relevance of policies for
the growth of economic complexity, and highlights the trade-off between increasing
the potential production of the system and its robustness to collapse. We discuss the
policy implications of intervening in the organization of interconnections and system
features, and stress how different network structures and node characteristics suggest
different directions in order to promote complex and robust economic systems.
Keywords: Network topology, Systemic risk, Economic complexity
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1 Introduction
1.1 Production networks and risk
As highly complex and networked systems, the properties of economies are characterized
by the behavior and interdependencies of their components (Bar-Yam, 1997; Hidalgo et al.,
2007; Barrat et al., 2008). Whether they arise from investments, trade or supply chains,
interdependencies are increasingly important in contemporary economic systems, and fun-
damental for risk assessment and evaluation (Schewitzer et al., 2009). Interconnections
enable the diversification of output, improve the efficiency of economies, and increase the
growth of economic complexity through the product space (Hidalgo et al., 2007). At the
same time, they also introduce paths for risk contagion and generate large-scale vulnerabil-
ities to systemic failure (Bar-Yam, 2010; Harmon et al., 2010). Given the current context
of increasing international trade, financialization and globalization of economies, it is cru-
cial to understand the effects of connectivity on networked economies and its relationship
to economic collapse.
Traditional economic studies focus on explaining collapse through the contribution
of different factors such as bankruptcy (Battiston et al., 2007), bank loans (Stiglitz and
Greenwald, 2003), interbank credits (Allen and Gale, 2000), and changes of asset prices
(Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Roukny et al. (2018) show that interconnections in bank sys-
tems through credit contracts and subject to correlated external shocks constitute a source
of uncertainty in systemic risk assessment. Additional studies have indeed emphasized on
the need for understanding the impact of network structure on the probability of collapse
(Schweitzer et al., 2009; Iyer et al., 2013; Albert et al., 2000). Battiston et al. (2012b)
emphasized their study on the identification of important nodes through feedback central-
ity with debt ranking. These studies show an inherent relationship between the structure
of the network and its robustness and vulnerability to selected attacks and random errors
independently of their nature. Stressing the systemic complexity of economic networks
may contribute to the design and implementation of policies leading to higher diversity
and efficiency without undermining the robustness of economic systems (Schwitzer et al.,
2009; Battiston et al., 2012b).
In this paper we develop a model to show that while the creation of interdependencies
among economic agents is fundamental for the growth of economic complexity, it also
amplifies the risk of collapse during adverse conditions. We show that the structure of in-
terconnections among economic agents increases the fragility of economic systems despite
an apparent improvement of their production complexity. We explore two different ways
in which systems can be interconnected: density and centralization. Density refers to the
number of connections that are drawn among agents independently. Centralization refers
to the emergence of highly connected nodes that bridge across large parts of the network.
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While different in nature, these directions show how nodes can become increasingly de-
pendent on one another, either directly or indirectly (through secondary connections). We
found that the transition to collapse is universal and independent of a specific network
structure. Instead the transition results from the reachability of nodes to one another and
the spreadability of their failure.
The architecture of economic networks is crucial to study their efficiency and vulner-
abilities to systemic failure. For example, if a vital firm within a supply chain suddenly
ceases to exist, all producers linked to the failing element become unable to produce their
output. The present analysis aims at quantifying both robustness and performance of pro-
duction networks for various levels of individual node failure, and for various degrees of
density and centralization in the network. Interconnections may under certain conditions
increase the complexity of production. However, as we introduce a non-zero probability
of failure, the expected diversity and productivity decreases, leading the way to economic
collapse.
There is a large literature on network robustness to internal failure and external at-
tacks on nodes or edges. Previous studies have mainly focused on two particular network
topologies: the Erdos-Re´nyi random graph (Erdos and Re´nyi, 1960) and Baraba´si’s scale-
free network (Baraba´si et al., 1999; Baraba´si and Bonabeau, 2003). Albert, Jeong and
Baraba´si (2000) studied error tolerance and attack impact, notably testing both web ro-
bustness to targeted attacks on well connected nodes, and to removal of a given nodes
fraction. Crucitti et al. (2003) study network robustness to failure and targeted attacks.
Iyer et al. (2013) likewise analyze how interconnections structure evolve with the removal
of vertices, for a variety of networks types. Lorenz, Battiston and Schweitzer (2009) devel-
oped a general framework to systemic risk with cascading failures processes in networks
through node fragility. Pichler et al. (2018) investigated the issue of systemic risk in the
context of efficient asset allocation in the form of a network optimization problem. Cac-
cioli et al. (2018) recently provided a thorough review of research in network models of
financial systemic risk. Buldyrev et al. (2010) extended the framework of network cascad-
ing failure analysis to the case of interconnected networks transmitting failure from one to
another. In the spirit of Albert et al. (2000) who focused on two models: the Erdos-Re´nyi
random network model (Erdos and Re´nyi, 1960) and the scale-free web (Baraba´si et al.,
1999; Baraba´si and Bonabeau, 2003), the present paper extends the investigation on the
robustness of networks models to a more general framework, including the transition from
random to scale-free networks and further centralization, as well as the effects of density
of connections.
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1.2 Production and collapse
Various indicators of network robustness, and by consequence its fragility, have been ex-
tensively used in the literature. The communication capacity of the network after nodes
removal has been analyzed by Crucitti et al. (2003). Albert et al. (2000) used the average
shortest path length among nodes in the network as a indicator of failure reachability. Iyer
et al. (2013) and Callaway et al. (2000) analyzed robustness as percolation efficiency on
networks. Lorenz et al. (2009) used the fraction of stable nodes after removing the failed
ones as a measure of systemic risk. Rather than providing an indicator of fragility, we show
the space of possible behaviors of networked production systems in terms of diversity of
outcome and probability of collapse for different scenarios regarding conditions to failure
and structure of interdependencies.
Collapse may be framed as a comparison of the current state of the system with respect
to a reference one. We define the reference state as the situation of autarky or network-free
environment, where agents have no interaction with each other. A production below such
reference state could be considered as collapse, i.e. a systemic failure of the network to
achieve the network-free production levels. Because the reference state is defined without
knowledge of the networked structure of the system, collapse is interpreted in our model
as the inability of the system to achieve the autarky production level. Our results are
generalizable and consistent with other definitions of collapse.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the network generation algo-
rithms and the production model. Section 3 presents the results of model simulations in
terms of productivity and collapse probability across multiple network topologies. Their
discussion, implications and relations to previous literature are provided in section 4. Sec-
tion 5 concludes on the impact of network connectivity structure on global production and
risk of failure in economic systems.
2 Model
We design a simple economic model of production, structured by a network of partnerships
or supply chains. Nodes are represented as economic agents, such as individuals, firms
or countries. Links indicate economic interdependencies. In order to produce goods,
networked agents need the input from their connections. Each node has an individual error
probability, analogous to the possibility of node removal in previous literature. Errors
propagate through cascades across the network. We consider two network generation
processes respectively based on the density or centralization of connections. In this section
we present the network generation processes, and define the mechanisms for production
and collapse.
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Figure 1: Visualization of network topologies from the density model. Panels show net-
works that result from different model parameters. The density of the networks increase
from left to right. The node color is proportional to the degree (from black to green).
Reach r = 4 and density δ = 0.028 in the left panel. Reach r = 10 and density δ = 0.053
in the middle panel. Reach r = 16 and density δ = 0.058 in the right panel.
2.1 The density network model
In order to analyze the impact of network density over production and risk of failure,
we create a network generation model. Nodes are randomly distributed in a torus space.
Their connections depend on their distance to each other and a threshold denoted reach.
Nodes first create a link with a randomly chosen node within the reach distance, denoted
target, and second create links with all nodes linked to the target node. The probability
of a node i to initially create a link to a node j at distance xij is as follows:
pij(xij) =
{
1
N(r) if xij ≤ r
0 if xij > r
(1)
where r indicates the reach radius and N(r) represents the total number of nodes at
reach from i. The number of potential target nodes N(r) increases proportionally to the
reach parameter r. The density of the network (δ) indicates the ratio between the number
of existing edges divided by the total number of possible edges in the network. Low reach
values yield only a few connections. As the reach parameter increases, so does the number
of connections and the network density. Figure 1 illustrates networks that result from
different model parameters. The density of the networks increase from left to right.
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2.2 The centralized network model
The centralized network model generates graphs with different levels of centralization. For
this purpose, we generalize the preferential attachment mechanism (Baraba´si and Albert,
1999) with an exponent that controls for the emergence and importance of hubs– ranging
from no centralization (independently distributed edges) to perfectly centralized networks
(in one or a couple hubs). In between the two extreme cases, we obtain a wide range of
scale-free networks where several hubs are present with different relative importance in
the graph.
The network generation process consists in creating edges as a function of the attach-
ment probability. The probability of node i to create an edge with node j is as follows:
pij ∝ kαj (2)
where kj is the number of connections of node j and α is the exponent we use to
control the influence of the preferential attachment mechanism. If α = 0, the attachment
probability becomes equal among all nodes and we obtain a random network with no
central hub similar to the Erdos-Ranyi model. If α = 1, we obtain the standard Baraba´si-
Albert network with a few hubs. If α = 2, we create a network with full centralization
where all nodes are linked to a single central one. This extension of the preferential
attachment mechanism magnifies the degree heterogeneity among nodes for α > 1, and
reduces such attractive force for any α < 1. An illustration of the model variants is shown
in Figure 2.
2.3 Production and collapse
The production mechanism is invariant across both network generation methods. In order
to run simulations, we create 100 economic agents and interconnect them following the
steps described in sections 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. Once the networks are created, we
simulate both production and failure.
Agents produce goods with uniform and constant production technology. We con-
sider production inputs as received endowments, without introducing stock constraints
or resource extraction. Agents produce as many goods as possible, under the constrains
imposed by the piece-wise production function described as follows:
qi =
{
1 if ki = 0
2n if ki = n, n ∈ N>0
(3)
where qi denotes production of node i, and ki its degree (number of connections). A node
without connections (ki = 0) will only produce 1 good. We define this state as autarky.
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α = 0 α = 1 α = 2
Figure 2: Visualization of network topologies from the centralized model. Panels show
networks that result from different model parameters. From left to right the centralization
of the network increases. The node color is proportional to the degree (from white to
green). The left panel shows a decentralized network, similar to the Erdos-Re´nyi model
(α = 0). The middle panel shows a scale-free network, similar to the Barabasi-Albert
model (α = 1). The right panel shows a perfectly centralized network (α = 2). The
number of edges and density is constant across all networks (δ = 0.02).
A node of n connections will be able to produce 2n goods (assuming no failure). The
hypothesis behind introducing a production scaling parameter is derived from the view of
production as a combinatorial process (Hidalgo et al., 2007). Economically speaking, it
may account for increasing returns to scale, heterogeneity in marginal cost or differences
in production efficiency.
Agents have an identical and exogenous failure probability p. It conveys the individual
probability of encountering issues in the production process and not providing any output
at a given period. This modelling specification can be related to error tolerance (Albert,
Jeaong and Baraba´si, 2000) and removal probability (Crucitti et al., 2003). We define this
phenomenon as individual failure. Individual failure may happen due to resource shortage,
production tools dysfunction, or any other exogenous event leading to null production.
Global failure arises as individual failures cascade across the network. Individual failure
is denoted failure probability, while global failure is denoted collapse probability.
Individual failure spreads across the network through direct connections, i.e. to the
economic partners directly linked to the failing node. We do not spread failure to neighbors
of neighbors in this simple contagion mechanism. Our node-driven approach is closely
related to Battiston et al. (2007, 2012a) who start from local interactions to study systemic
failure, providing a new framework for understanding failure propagation. Our direct
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propagation framework enables the analysis of cascading failures, which is an important
phenomenon to be considered in the study of network robustness (Crucitti et al., 2013).
Accounting for failure probability p, and with ki nodes directly linked to node i, the
piece-wise conditional expected production function E(qi|p) can be defined as follows:
E(qi|p) =
{
(1− p) if ki = 0
2n(1− p)n if ki = n, n ∈ N>0
(4)
If ki = n > 0, node i’s production is equal to 2n with probability (1 − p)n and equal
to 0 with probability 1 − (1 − p)n. A sub network of n directly connected agents has a
collective probability (1 − p)n of not failing (i.e. all nodes produce). With probability
1 − (1 − p)n, at least one node fails and the entire sub network is not able to produce.
Given that the production scales by a factor of 2n, the expected production function takes
the value 2n(1 − p)n for any n > 0. For an autarkic node i, for which the number of
neighbors ki is null, the productivity is equal to 1, adjusted to the probability p of failing
at each experiment. The expected production at each experiment for such node is thus
equal to (1− p).
This production function specification illustrates the trade-off we examine between
inter-connectivity and risk. In the density model, higher connectivity results in both
better possible production, but also increased risk on the entire supply chains. In the
centralized network, the central node has the potential to deliver a huge output, but is
vulnerable to the failure of any other node it is connected to. The indicators developed in
the next subsection allow us to measure these phenomena.
2.4 Measuring collapse and efficiency
The model is run for a given number of independent periods or experiments. We consider
the failure and contagion processes as being transient. The failure of a node at a given
experiment does not affect its state on the next experiment. This choice of simplicity
identifies the impact of the network structure over systemic risk and productivity. We
define the system’s total production T at each experiment t as the sum of the individual
agent production levels qi as follows:
Tt =
N∑
i=1
qi (5)
where N is the total number of nodes in the network.
At a given experiment, we define collapse as the situation where the total production of
the system Tt is below a reference level λ, which is the expected production of the system
in the autarky regime.
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λ(N, p) = N(1− p) (6)
The production level λ(N, p) does not depend on the network structure. It enables
the performance analysis of any network topology with respect to the autarky case, and
evaluate whether any particular system architecture is expected to yield higher or lower
production. Through numerical simulations of the model, we apply Monte-Carlo to es-
timate the collapse probability over 10.000 independent experiments for each possible
set of the model parameters, including different levels of failure probability and network
topologies.
The model is implemented in the agent-based environment Netlogo (Wilensky, 1999).
We use the Pattern Space Exploration and Sampling algorithms from the OpenMole plat-
form (Che´rel et al., 2015, Reuillon et al. 2010, 2013) to identify areas of high variation
in the model results and improve both tractability and validation. More details about
the model implementation and simulation methodology can be found in the Supplement
(Section S1).
3 Results
3.1 Mapping system productivity
We define the system productivity level pi as the ratio of the system average production
(equation 4) and the reference autarky production level. A production level of pi = 2
indicates that the system is able to double the autarky output level. Figure 3 shows the
production levels (colored regions) of different network structures as a function of indi-
vidual probability of failure (x-axis) and the parameters (y-axis) of the density (left) and
centralized (right) models respectively. Red regions in Figure 3 indicate high production,
and green and blue regions indicate lower production. In the Supplement (subsection
S2) we provide additional figures from the Pattern Space Exploration procedure used to
determine areas of variation.
In both models, increasing the density or centralization of network connections results
in higher production levels when the probability of failure is low (red regions near the
vertical axis), given the possibility of agents to establish interdependencies and combine
elements to create more complex products. However, as the probability of failure increases,
the average output decreases with the density or centralization of connections. This effect
is more abrupt in centralized systems (right panel). Therefore, increasing the number of
interdependencies may increase the complexity of the economic systems but it also makes
them more fragile to individuals’ failure.
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(a) Density model (b) Centralized model
Figure 3: Network productivity as a function of model parameters. Color indicates average
productivity (log unit) in units of the autarky level on logarithmic scale. The left panel
shows the outcomes of the density model. The right panel shows the outcomes of the
centralized model. The x-axis represents the probability of individual failure in both
panels. The y-axis represents the network density (left panel) or centralization (right
panel). Scale shown in figure.
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(a) Density model (b) Centralized model
Figure 4: Probability of systemic collapse as a function of model parameters. Color
indicates the collapse probability. The left panel shows the outcomes of the density model.
The right panel shows the outcomes of the centralized model. The x-axis represents the
probability of individual failure in both panels. The y-axis represents the network density
(left panel) or centralization (right panel). Scale shown in figure.
3.2 Mapping the collapse probability
While interconnections enable the creation of economic complexity, they also increase the
probability of failure propagation and consequently the risk of global collapse. Figure 4
provides a precise mapping of system collapse probability as a function of network structure
(given in the parameters of the network density and centralization models) and probability
of failure. Blue regions indicate very low risk of collapse. Red areas show very high risk of
collapse. In both models, there is a region where the probability of collapse is low (blue).
In these regions the productivity of the system is also high, as we previously noticed in
Figure 3. The probability of collapse increases when we either increase the probability of
failure, for a given network setup, or when we increase the number of interdependencies,
for probabilities of failure that are not close to zero.
The transition from robust (blue) to fragile (red) systems seem to be very sharp (yellow
and green regions in Figure 4). This indicates the existence of tipping points for each
network setup. Moreover, the location of the tipping point changes as we modify the
network structure or failure probability. It comes closer to the vertical axis as we increase
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(a) Density model (b) Centralized model
Figure 5: System productivity and network properties. Productivity is measured in units
of the reference level of production in the autarky regime (y-axis). The x-axis shows the
network density (left panel) or centralization (right panel). Dots show the results of model
simulations. Solid lines show the fitted curve using Polynomial Regression. Colors indicate
distinct values of failure probability. Scale in figure.
the density or centralization of the network. Denser or more centralized networks are more
sensitive (or fragile) to individual failure.
In Figure 3 we showed that the highest levels of production take place when the density
or centralization of connections is highest and the probability of failure is lowest (upper left
corner). In Figure 4 we notice that such region is also the most fragile to an increase of the
probability of failure. Notice that the number of links is constant in the centralized model
and only the centralization of edges around hubs changes as we increase the parameter
α. Therefore, two radically different network models present remarkable similarities in
their behavior, which shows that centralizing interdependencies in a few nodes is just as
potentially harmful as creating an excess of them in a distributed manner.
3.3 Productivity and network structure
Despite similarities, the results presented in Figures 3 and 4 also show differences between
the two network models. These differences are manifested in the way system productivity
changes as we vary failure probability. Figure 5 shows system productivity (Log unit) as a
function of network density (left) and centralization (right) for various values of individual
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(a) Density model (b) Centralized model
Figure 6: Collapse probability and network properties. The y-axis represents the collapse
probability as explained in section 2.4. The x-axis represents the probability of failure.
Dots show the results of model simulations. Colors indicate distinct values of network
density (left) and centralization (right). Scale in figure.
failure probability (color). The curves exhibit non linear behaviors.
In the density model (left panel in Figure 5) there seem to be two distinct behaviors
depending on the individual failure probability (color). If individual failure probability
is below 0.4 (blue), the curves are concave downward and present a maximum value at
density values that depend on the failure probability (for example at δ = 0.02 for p = 0.2
or δ = 0.0175 for p = 0.2). The interval in which network density has a positive effect
on productivity becomes narrower as individual failure probability increases. Above a
failure probability of 0.4, the curves change their behavior and become concave upward
(green, yellow and red). In this case, higher density results immediately in a decrease
of productivity values regardless of the initial network density. On the other hand, in
the network centralization model (right panel in Figure 5), the curves are always concave
downward and monotonically decreasing. In this case, an inflection point that accelerates
the decrease of productivity appears when hubs start to gain more importance in the
network (α > 1).
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3.4 Collapse probability and network structure
In Figure 6, we analyze the behavior of the collapse probability as a function of individual
failure probability by horizontally slicing the surface shown in Figure 4 at different values
of density (left panel) or centralization (right panel).
In both cases, the curves are monotonically increasing, showing that the risk of spread-
ing failure is aligned with both network density and centralization. However, the behavior
is non-linear. For small values of failure probability (dark blue curves) there is an interval
of network density or centralization in which the system seems robust. In the case of the
density model, the robust interval coincides with the location of maximum productivity
points shown in Figure 5a. As the networks get denser or more centralized (green, yellow
and red curves in Figure 6) the extent of the robust interval gets narrower, confirming
that the excess of interdependencies increases the fragility of the system. Such decrease
occurs more rapidly in the case of centralized networks.
Using data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity, we apply the model to esti-
mate the vulnerability of international trade networks from 1962 to 2012. Nodes represent
countries and edges are present if they have traded on a given year. In the supplement,
(Figure S3 in Section S3) we show that the the expansion of interconnections among coun-
tries has increased the global sensitivity to failure from 1962 to 2012, with a peak in 2007
just before the last major economic crisis.
3.5 Universality of collapse
The curves in Figure 6 suggest that the relationship between collapse and interdependen-
cies (either in the form of density or centralization) can be modeled by a sigmoid function,
with the following form:
f(x) =
1
1 + e−a(x−b)
(7)
where a determines the slope of the transition and b the location of the inflection
point. In Figure 7, we present the results of fitting the sigmoid function to the collapse
probability as a function of failure probability for both network models, at various levels
of density (left) and centralization (right) respectively. In order to collapse the curves we
normalize the original failure probability (p) by subtracting the location parameter of the
sigmoid function (b), such that p∗ = p− b.
The ubiquity of sigmoidal patterns in the transition to collapse on such different net-
work models and various parameters suggests the existence of a universal behavior. As
shown in Figure 6, the sigmoids are present in both types of networks and increasing in-
terdependencies simply moves the inflection point closer to the origin and yields steeper
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(a) Density model (b) Centralized model
Figure 7: Universal behavior of collapse probability. The left panel shows the results for
the density model. The right panel shows the results for the centralized model. Dots
represent the resulting collapse probability (y-axis) of model simulations. The solid lines
show the fit to the sigmoid function. Colors indicate the respective model parameters (scale
inset). The x-axis represents the normalized failure probability (p∗), after subtracting the
location parameter of the sigmoid curve.
slopes, which indicates higher sensitivity to errors and system fragility. These results indi-
cate that two radically different economic systems, such as centralized and decentralized
economies, may fail because of one consistent reason which lies in the dynamics of failure
propagation across networks and excess of direct or indirect interdependencies. Like in
other complex systems, universalities represent the general structure in which phenomena
take place. While individual instances may present different and heterogeneous details,
i.e. prices, markets, bureaucracy, etc., there is an underlying structure that is common
among them and in which they develop. In order to achieve effective solutions, we must
understand and intervene in such structure. Otherwise, there is a risk of spending efforts
in designing solutions based on the particularities of each case without considering the
relevant variables.
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4 Discussion
4.1 Too interconnected to thrive?
Simulations show that production networks get increasingly sensitive to the propagation
of individual failure as their topologies get denser and agents linked to each other. The
resulting production may decrease faster than linearly with respect to failure probability.
Sparser networks may have a lower productivity but are more resilient to probability of
failure. Previous research has investigated the risks of creating agents ”too big to fail”,
or more recently ”too central to fail” (Battiston et al. 2012b). In the continuity of this
observation, our model emphasizes that without further hypotheses, economic agents may
in some situations become too interconnected to thrive.
This observation from model results, notably drawing from Figure 4a (density model),
emphasizes the existence of positive returns to interconnections in system robustness below
a given density tipping point. Above such a threshold, returns to interconnections play a
negative role. Such a mapping of production performance and systemic risk in the sense
of global failure appears relevant in tackling efficient asset allocation and minimization of
systemic risk as a network optimization problem (Pichler et al., 2018).
These results on returns to interconnections also allow us to replicate in a more general
context the findings of Albert, Jeong and Baraba´si (2000) on error tolerance of scale-free
networks. Their results indicate that systems exhibit strong robustness below a level
of error of 5%. This is consistent with the results we obtain in the centralized model
(α = 1) when the probability of individual failure p = 0.05 (Figure 4b). In such networks
the collapse probability is low and average production is satisfied. Our analysis thus
successfully replicates their findings, while generalizing the study of network robustness
to a larger range of organizations and organizing principles.
4.2 Risk diversification or containment?
As noted in the founding work of Schweitzer et al. (2009), traditional economic theory
often concludes that dense networks enable risk diversification to counterbalance failure
(Allen and Gale, 2000). Risk diversification remains relevant in the context of production,
as producers may prefer to protect themselves against the failure of suppliers or trade part-
ners (Bar-Yam, 2010). Battiston et al. (2007) identified instead that systemic risk may
increase with network coupling strength between nodes in credit chains and production
networks during bankruptcy propagation. Contrary to the more general policy implica-
tions of Allen and Gale (2000), Battiston et al. (2012c) identified that risk diversification
not always reduces systemic risk.
Our model contributes to this debate extending the observations over a larger set of
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networks topologies. As illustrated in Figure 4a, our model identifies parameter intervals
in which increased density is not detrimental to systemic risk, here denoted as collapse
probability of the production system, pointing back to the findings of Allen and Gale
(2000). The dark blue region of collapse probability in the density model (Figure 4a),
show that the increasing network density through risk diversification, here understood as
the creation of additional connections, is not harmful to system robustness if individual
probabilities of failure are low. This extent, denoted ”density threshold”, differs according
to network topologies.
Risk diversification through increased density may be beneficial for the expected pro-
ductivity in certain intervals of network density and individual failure probabilities (Figure
3a). However, in environments characterized by higher individual risks, increasing network
density may lead to major changes in collapse probability, pushing the system towards un-
stable situations (red regions in Figure 4a). These results are in line with previous research
of Battiston et al. (2012a, 2012c). They show endogenous emergence of systemic risk be-
cause of feedback effects resulting from an excess of interdependencies. Our model shows
that risk diversification improves global robustness only in an interval of individual risk of
failure and outlines that systems may become sensitive too sensitive to individual failure
if density and centralization are too high. We show that the transition is not smooth and
instead it universally follows a sigmoid behavior. Analogue phase transition process are
shown in the model of Lorenz et al. (2009). Our model extends this study with networks
displaying centralization (Figure 4b). In this case, the collapse probability increases more
abruptly and is more sensitive to the risk of individual failure.
4.3 Policy implications
Previous literature on systemic risk has raised important suggestions for policy actions.
Protection measures have been pointed as necessary through identification of essential
nodes (Battiston et al., 2012b). Others opted for a systemic risk tax (Leduc and Thurner,
2017b), in order to make bank networks robust to insolvency cascades, or through an
adequate credit default swap market, where CDS assets are taxed according to their con-
tribution to systemic risk (Leduc et al., 2017a). Other scholars have emphasized on the
importance of taking networks of interdependencies into account for improving systems’
resilience (Buldyrev et al., 2010) in the context of contagion (Marsiglio et al., 2019).
Barriers to contain risk contagion may improve global robustness, whether imple-
mented around a centralized node, or distributed across the decentralized network. Further
research on such implementation may shed new light on the impact of safety barriers on
different network topologies. However, action in centralized networks cannot be reduced
to protection on the central node, and may have less effect than expected, as expressed
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by Braha and Bar-Yam (2006).
5 Conclusion
In summary, we analyzed the effects of establishing interdependencies among economic
agents on arising production complexity and systemic risk. We show that while interde-
pendencies are beneficial for creating more complex products, they also create paths for
failure propagation and amplify the fragility of the system–an effect often overlooked in
the literature of economic complexity. Our results show that different network topolo-
gies, such as dense or centralized networks, show universal patterns of behavior, due to
the common dynamics of cascading propagation through direct and indirect connections.
Understanding universalities is critical in order to achieve effective solutions beyond the
particular characteristics of individual cases. Further research accounting for additional
policies such as the enforcement of new types of interdependencies, or application to em-
pirical risk estimation and real economic of financial networks, may contribute to identify
opportunities for improving the functioning and complexity of economic systems without
compromising their robustness and resilience.
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Supplementary Material
S1 Model implementation
The model is implemented in the agent-based environment Netlogo (Wilensky, 1999).
Agent-based modeling offers a relevant tool to study complex systems, as they emphasize
the role of individual interactions, that may be local, heterogeneous and interdependent,
and displays flexibility in network generation from the node perspective. As noted Wilde-
meersch et al. (2016), the behavior of interconnected systems as network systems is too
complex to be adequately modeled by traditional tools, suggesting quantitative and sim-
ulations methods as possible adequate modelling tools to study network resilience and
fragility. Nevertheless, the complexity of the dynamics they describe has created a tough
challenge to keep the model tractable and its results understandable. A major criticism
addressed to multi-agent models and the use of simulation models, in general, is indeed
focused on the lack of tractability of the results and of the model dynamics. Dealing with
several parameters, complex interactions and issues of stochasticity and randomness, new
tools in simulation exploration and analysis may be required to assess solid understanding
of model behavior.
The OpenMole platform introduced by (Reuillon et al. 2010, 2013) and more specif-
ically its embedded Pattern Space Exploration (PSE) algorithm described in (Che´rel et
al., 2015) provides a useful tool to improve model understanding by looking at unexpected
patterns and exploring the space of outputs generated by the model. This method allows
pushing the standards of model validation, commonly done by verifying that the model is
able to reproduce the patterns to be explained, to test the validity of the model against
unexpected input combinations. The Pattern Space Exploration (PSE) algorithm thus al-
lows to identifying all different output patterns generated by a given range of parameters,
which may be useful to understand causality in complex simulation models. It permits to
identify regardless of observer’s assumption the ”areas of interest” of the model, i.e. where
variation in output occurs. It finally offers significant benefits in computation efficiency,
as areas of little or no variation are not explored by the algorithm, in contrast with a
classical sampling task. We thus obtain through the PSE method a more efficient and
precise understanding of model areas of interest.
S2 Pattern Space Exploration figures
Figure S1 displays the results of the Pattern Space Exploration (PSE) algorithm im-
plemented in the early steps of the analysis, in order to identify the main dynamics of
collapse probability in the model, with respect to individual probability of failure and net-
1
work structure parameters, i.e. density and centralization. The abrupt impact of higher
probability of failures in centralized networks can be observed. The sigmoidal transition
in both network structure can also be identified, as well as the low risk (blue) and high
risk (red) regions of the parameter space. The white areas in the PSE figures indicate
parameter space combinations in which not much variation in output (here for Figure S1
collapse probability) occur. Figure S2 studies the variations in average aggregate pro-
duction of the systems in the space of parameters, composed of individual probability of
failure and network structure. They outline the relative variations in each topology, and
already allow to identify key regions of relative better or worse productivity in the system.
The more abrupt transition in the centralization topology towards lower production in the
case of excessive interconnections or individual risk is observable.
S3 Trade Networks and Systemic Risk
We applied our model to estimate the transition to collapse on global trade networks.
The networks have been built with data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity.
Nodes represent countries and edges indicate trade at particular years. In Figure S3
shows that from 1962 to 2012, the systemic risk has increased due to the expansion of
interconnections. The figure outlines as well the fragility of trade networks. Certain
systemic collapse is attained from a country failure probability of 0.02, i.e. 2%.
2
(a) Density model
(b) Centralized model
Figure S1: Probability of systemic collapse using Pattern Space Exploration. Color indi-
cates probability of collapse. Scale in figure.
3
(a) Density model
(b) Centralized model
Figure S2: Average production using Pattern Space Exploration. Color indicates average
production. Scale in figure.
4
Figure S3: 5-year evolution of systemic risk in trade networks computed using our model.
Data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity.
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